The logic BAN was developed in the late eighties to reason about authenticated key establishment protocols. It uncovered many a ws and properties of protocols, thus generating lots of attention in protocol analysis. BAN itself was also subject of much attention, and work was done examining its properties and limitations, developing extensions and alternatives, and giving it a semantics.
Early Approaches to Knowledge
Automated approaches using model checkers, theorem provers and the like have increasingly been at the heart of formal analysis of security protocols for the last several years. However, for much of the nineties the most well known and successful approach to this problem was by hand analysis using specialized logics. A belief logic, BAN 2 , was widely used to reveal a numberof aws and hidden assumptions in protocols. It also gave rise to a numberof extensions, variations and related alternatives, which also had many successes. We will return to BAN below, but we rst begin at the beginning. Hand logics themselves began to be published at about the same time as other formal methods of protocol analysis, in the late eighties. But, the rst epistemic treatment of protocols may be found about ve years earlier in the work of Merritt and various coauthors 10,4,11 . As implied hand logics" were originally devised for hand analysis; however, most of them have been automated in one form or another, often with great success. Merritt's approach w as basically algebraic rather than logical. However, this algebraic approach w as used to characterize the state of knowledge of various protocol participants. We will see that this approach can be closely related to the semantics of an epistemic logic.
Algebraic Knowledge Semantics
The semantics used to underly much of epistemic logic is based on a model theoretic treatment of possible worlds. The idea of possible worlds is that there are di erent ways the world might be or epistemically, might be conceived to be. For each principal we can partition up all the possible worlds into those that are indistinguishable to him. Since this is a partition, it yields an indistinguishability relation that is an equivalence. For example, if Bob does not know whether Alice is in her o ce, then worlds in which Alice is in her o ce and worlds where she is not in her o ce are indistinguishable to him excluding other distinguishing information. Thus, possible worlds can be used to underly a logic of knowledge. This has been studied as far back as 8 . The characterization of knowledge by equivalence relations is in fact just one of the types of knowledge set out in 8 and later. Other relations are possible; thus indistinguishability is sometimes more generally called`accessibility'|e.g., the relation might not be symmetric. What has all this to do with cryptographic protocols?
Suppose Alice and Bob are executing a coin-ip protocol. Alice sends to Bob two messages in random order, one is the encryption of a bit representing a heads and the other that of a bit representing a tails. They are both encrypted with the same key, which is known only to Alice. In the common notation we have, fHeadsg K and fTailsg K where Bob does not know K. Bob does not know whether the rst or second message is the encryption of Heads. Actually, he does not know that either is the encryption of Heads at all. But, we ignore this for the moment. So, there are at least two possible worlds indistinguishable by Bob: one where he has been sent the encryption of Heads followed by the encryption of Tails, and the other where that order is reversed.
Merritt examined such protocols using free algebras of messages with encryption and decryption operators. Such a free algebra represents the basic structure of the cryptosystem. The speci c encryption and decryption algorithms used and the domain of messages is called the crypto-algebra. If we 2 assume that there are no aws in the crypto algorithms themselves, we can basically assume that the free algebra and the crypto-algebra are isomorphic.
In the coin-ip example, Bob does not know about all the messages. Thus, there are di erent homomorphic mappings from the free algebra to the cryptoalgebra that are indistinguishable by Bob. These mappings are e ectively the indistinguishable possible worlds for Bob in this state. This algebraic approach w as extended by T oussaint 23 to examine evolving knowledge in protocol executions. The connection between such algebraic approaches and epistemic logic was made explicit by Bieber 3 when he used the constructs of 11 to underly the semantics of his logic CKT5. There have been other algebraic approaches to authentication protocol representation and analysis, for example, using process algebras such as CSP and the spi calculus. We will not discuss these in this paper.
The BAN Family
We now turn to a particular family of logics, stemming from the BAN logic of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham. BAN was created for examining authenticated key distribution protocols. These are typically protocols that allow two parties to establish a key for a secure communication session. Since the parties do not usually have a pre-existing shared secret, these protocols rely on a trusted server either online or o ine to facilitate the distribution and often to generate the session key. Typical goals of such protocols are thus that the parties share the key, that no-one else does, and that they know with whom they are sharing the key.
The contribution of BAN was to set out a logic in simple terms notably belief, jurisdiction, freshness, and the goodness of a key for two named principals that revealed hidden assumptions and aws in protocols through quite simple hand analysis. Another contribution that BAN made was to reason about time, but only in the roughest terms. Speci cally, they distinguished only between messages that were fresh, i.e., sent during the currentepoch, and those that were not. This also proved to be a very useful balance of simplicity and expressiveness.
Here is an example of a BAN message-meaning" rule.
This basically says that if P believes K is a goodkey for P to talk with Q and P receives X encrypted with K, then P believes that Q once said X. The rule assumes that P can recognize messages he produced himself.
Rather than set out all the rules of BAN, we will go through the concepts that were introduced in BAN and sometimes modi ed by others. We will also generally use the notation of AT 1 and SVO 17 , which is closer to ordinary English. 3
A message is fresh if it has not been part of a message sent prior to the current epoch. It is su cient but not necessary for freshness that a message be unseen prior to the current epoch. A principal might generate a message earlier and not send it until the epoch begins.
Freshness is central to the notion of authentication. Just because someone once said that a key was good, does not mean that they would say s o n o w. If a message is bound, e.g., cryptographically, to a fresh message, then it must itself be fresh. Freshness is typically insured by means of nonces random numbers generated to be recognized later by those who generate them or timestamps from a trusted source.
One limitation of BAN is that the only way to promote to the present epoch from P said M given that freshM is to say that P believes M. BAN has no expression P says M. Amongst other things, this either 1 limits the promotion of once-said to recently-said believed messages to formulae rather than messages in general, or 2 gives rise to a somewhat counterintuitive notion of belief. Brie y, a formula is essentially a message that expresses a proposition. We assume a language in which all formulae are messages, but not necessarily vice versa. The says notation was introduced in 1 .
Saying and Receiving
As the message meaning rule illustrates, one says not only the messages one sends, but also certain messages implicit in what one sends. Similarly for receiving, e.g., one receives the concatenates of a concatenated message. BAN generally does not express those messages simply possessed by a principal, as opposed to sent and received. For example, in contrast to the message meaning rule, assuming that P received fXg K , if P sees K whether or not P believes P K $ Q, then P sees X, whether or not P believes Q said X.
This expressiveness was added in GNY 7 , and to some extent in 1 .
More importantly, BAN cannot distinguish between those message that are understood by a recipient, e.g., upon decryption, and those that are not. Which is not to say that, BAN did not address this question. It was simply explicitly limited to describing receipt of messages that could be understood. Notation and rules to represent and reason with recognizability w ere added in 7 , and a systematic semantic treatment of comprehension of messages was introduced in 17 .
The semantics presented in this paper will distinguish between whole messages that P received and messages that may be contained in these that P got . We will see below, in section 4.3.1, that these have a more extensional meaning than the recognizable messages of GNY or the comprehended messages of SVO. We will leave for future work discussion of those messages that P simply possesses.
Jurisdiction
One needs a way to promote a claim by a key server that K is good for 4 Syverson P and Q to speak P K $ Q to the truth of this claim. This is the notion of jurisdiction. In BAN, one could express that if P believes Q controls ' and P believes Q said ', then P believes Q believes '. In AT, with its says construct, jurisdiction can be boiled down to its essentials: if Q controls ' and Q says ', then '. Belief is not necessary to express jurisdiction. In general, AT separated out the belief axioms from the other axioms, allowing a normal modal logic of belief and a model-theoretic possible world semantics for it.
Keys
BAN is expressive enough to reason about both public-key and secret-key authentication protocols. As noted, ability to directly express possession of keys, and reason accordingly was added in GNY and AT. In VO 12 , the ability t o reason about Di e-Hellman key agreement was added to a version of GNY. Also added was the di erentiation of public key use for signature and encryption. A semantics for all of these was given in 17 . For the remainder of this paper, we will limit ourselves to secret-key expressions for simplicity. We will also not talk about other cryptographic constructs, such as hashes. These are all left for future work.
This concludes our nutshell exposition of the main concepts formalized in BAN-style languages. It does not nearly address all of the issues that were engendered by BAN, nor all of the authors that discussed them. However, it does cover all of the main concepts formalized in BAN. So, it is adequate for purposes of a rst attempt to sketch a strand semantics for a BAN-style language. We now turn to the presentation of the necessary background on strand spaces.
Strand Spaces
In this section, we s k etch out some of the basic elements of strand spaces. We also discuss some small extensions to make the model richer and to allow it to serve as a semantics for a richer logic. We present here only as much of the model as is needed to understand its use as a semantics in the next section. Further details can be found in 19 22 . A strand is basically a local history of sent and received messages in a protocol run. A strand space is a collection of strands. A bundle is a graph that re ects a causally meaningful way that a set of strands might be connected.
The messages sent b e t ween principals are taken from an algebra A of terms. We will say more about the algebra presently. Terms can besigned, e.g., +t or ,t, to indicate sending and receiving of messages respectively. Let be a set of strands and A bethe set of all nite sequences of signed terms. iii There is an edge n 1 ! n 2 if and only if termn 1 = + a and termn 2 = ,a for some a 2 A. Intuitively, the edge means that node n 1 sends the message a, which is received by n 2 , recording a potential causal link between those strands.
iv When n 1 = hs; ii and n 2 = hs; i + 1 i are members of N, there is an edge n 1 n 2 . Intuitively, the edge expresses that n 1 is an immediate causal predecessor of n 2 on the strand s. We write n 0 + n to mean that n 0 precedes n not necessarily immediately on the same strand.
N together with both sets of edges n 1 ! n 2 and n 1 n 2 is a directed graph hN; ! i.
De nition 3.3 Suppose ! C !; suppose C ; and suppose C = hN C ; ! C C i is a subgraph of hN; ! i. C is a bundle if: i C is nite. ii If n 2 2 N C and termn 2 is negative, then there is a unique n 1 such that n 1 ! C n 2 . iii If n 2 2 N C and n 1 n 2 then n 1 C n 2 . iv C is acyclic.
De nition 3.4 If S is a set of edges, i.e. S ! , then S is the transitive closure of S, and S is the re exive, transitive closure of S.
The relations S and S are each subsets of N S N S , where N S is the set of nodes incident with any edge in S.
These are all of the de nitions that we need to set out a possible worlds model and semantics for sending, receiving, and knowledge. We will provide below more details about the term algebra that will allow u s to express, e.g., that a principal who receives a ciphertext encrypted message and has the decryption key has also got the unencrypted message.
Possible worlds from Strand Spaces
We now describe the possible world semantics of epistemic logics for distributed computing in general and for security protocols in particular, e.g., 1,17 . 6
Traditional System Model and Knowledge Semantics
Computation is performed by a nite set of principals, P hr; t i P hr 0 ; t 0 i i P is in the same local state at both points, i.e., r P t = r 0 P t 0 . Aside: When the relation is not an equivalence, we typically need to say something about properties of the local state to describe the relation, although not necessarily much. For example, if we have some meaningful notion of substate, one possibility i s hr; t i ; P hr 0 ; t 0 i i r 0 P t 0 is a substate of r P t The accessibility relation we will set out below is an equivalence, and we will say no more about this.
Given an indistinguishability relation, we can then go on to de ne principal P 's knowledge in terms of the worlds that are P -indistinguishable.
hr; t i j = P knows ' i hr 0 ; t 0 i j = ' for all hr 0 ; t 0 i such that hr; t i P hr 0 ; t 0 i Aside: We have sketched out a semantics for knowledge, speci cally S5 knowledge, for a distributed system. The modality for most of the logics in the BAN family is in fact belief. The reasons for and signi cance of choosing one or the other have been discussed elsewhere, e.g. 1,14 , and we will say n o more about the matter here.
The above system model and characterization of knowledge is essentially what is found in 1,17 . It is largely based on similar models and characterizations of knowledge in distributed computing. Cf., e.g., 6 . We now turn 7 speci cally to strand spaces as a basis for knowledge semantics.
Strand Semantics for Knowledge
In the conclusion of 19 it was suggested that, w hat a protocol participant knows, in virtue of his experience in executing a protocol, is that he has performed the actions lying on some strand s. Thus, the real world must include some bundle C such that s is contained in C. The beliefs that the participant may justi ably hold are those that are true in every bundle C containing s." Thus, a possible world on this approach is simply a bundle. This is a reasonable approach for reasoning about some protocol features. However, we found it also worthwhile to include in the de nition of possible worlds the nodes within bundles. We did this in order to capture temporal aspects of the above authentication logics, speci cally freshness. This will also facilitate the addition of richer temporal formulae to the logic, as in 15 .
Neither strand spaces nor bundles have a notion of global time. Thus we cannot have an indistinguishability relation that corresponds directly to the above. However, hC; s ; i i picks a unique point hs; ii in bundle C and partitions N C into fht; ji : ht; ji C hs; iig and fht; ji : ht; ji 6 C hs; iig. This partition allows us to de ne an accessibility relation on nodes in bundles based on local time.
De nition 4.1 i Given a strand s, let princs refer to the principal whose strand s is.
ii Given a node hs; ii and a strand t in a bundle C, let the restriction of t to hs; ii in C be trt hs; ii = htrt 1 ; : : : ; trt j i, where ht; ji is the greatest node on t s.t. ht; ji C hs; ii.
With this notation in place we can now de ne an indistinguishability relation.
Assume bundles C; C 0 , and strands s; s 0 , and indices i; i 0 such that hs; ii 2 N C and, hs 0 ; i 0 i 2 N C 0 . A natural de nition, analogous to the runs-and-times de nition of the traditional literature would beto have hC; s ; i i P hC 0 ; s 0 ; i 0 i i.e., hC; s ; i i is P -indistinguishable from hC 0 ; s 0 ; i 0 i just in case P 's history in C up to hs; ii matches P 's history in C 0 up to hs 0 ; i 0 i. This is exactly right.
However, just as there is no global time in a bundle, there may also be multiple strands associated with one principal. The resulting de nition is thus:
De nition 4.2 hC; s ; i i is P -indistinguishable from hC 0 ; s 0 ; i 0 i written as hC; s ; i i P hC 0 ; s 0 ; i 0 i i i for any t in C s.t. princt = P there exists t 0 in C 0 s.t. trt hs; ii = trt 0 s 0 ; i 0 and princt 0 = P , and ii the numberofstrands satisfying clause i is the same in C and C 0 . 8 Syverson 
Truth Conditions for BAN-Style Formulae
The purpose of this section, is to present truth conditions for basic formulae of a BAN-style language. The basic notions we c o ver are freshness, key goodness, said and received got messages, and jurisdiction.
Given our de nition of P above we can now present truth conditions for knowledge in this semantics. Let ' be some formula in our language. We will de ne j = inductively; however the presentation is organized pedagogically rather than to respect the inductive construction. We assume the usual truth conditions for logical connectives; although we will not discuss compound formulae in this paper. hC; s ; i i j = P knows ' i hC 0 ; s 0 ; i 0 i j = ' at all hC 0 ; s 0 ; i 0 i s.t. hC; s ; i i P hC 0 ; s 0 ; i 0 i
This de nition gives a strand semantics for knowledge in a distributed environment. However, we have not described what speci c types of things ' might express. We can give semantics for formulae expressing the sending and receiving of messages without giving any more details about the model. But, before we do, we discuss the di erence between the above knowledge semantics and some of those that have preceded it.
Discussion: What you see is what you get?
One of the especially tricky features of AT and SVO is how to represent the receipt of messages by a principal that were not understood, or worse, partially understood. The above semantics opts for simplicity in its respect of subtle epistemic intuitions.
To illustrate, if P receives ffXg K 2 fY g K 3 g K 1 and P has the keys K 1 and K 2 but not K 3 , we may or may not not want to say that P knows that he has received ffXg K 2 fY g K 3 g K 1 . Both AT and SVO adopt some notation to indicate those messages not recognized by P , essentially replacing fY g K 3 in this message with a placeholder for not-understood messages, i.e., those that cannot ultimately be tied back to plaintext. SVO further di erentiates speci c not-understood messages so that, e.g., the same not-understood message can be recognized if seen again. This is summed up in SVO b y the comprehension axiom that basically says that if P believes he sees F X, then he believes he sees X.`F ' here is metanotation for any e ectively one-one function such that either it or its inverse is computable in practice by P . This includes encryption and decryption with the relevant key treated as a parameter. The intuition behind this is that when P believes P received a message as opposed to just receiving it then P must understand what the message says, i.e., its structure.
The semantics we have described above does not respect this intuition. However, it respects another, somewhat contrary intuition, namely that P believes he received this message whatever it is. The di erence between 9 these two intuitions can be illustrated by means of the coin-ip example of section 1. means. In particular he doesn't know therefore that he was sent Heads as opposed to Tails, or for that matter that this is an encrypted message as opposed to a random string. If on the other hand K were to be placed in Bob's key set at some point, at that point h e would know that he got Heads, by the above truth conditions for got formulae. To some extent this intuition is captured in SVO b y means of its distinct not-understood-message markers, but it still assumes that a principal understands all the structure in a message about which he has a belief. The above semantics may not capture the same epistemic subtleties as SVO, but it has a greater simplicity i n this respect as well as a natural t with the existing strand space constructs. We n o w return to the presentation of truth conditions.
Let M bean arbitrary message from our term algebra A.
hC; s ; i i j = P sent M i there is a node ht; ji in C s.t. i princt = P , ii ht; ji h s; ii, and iii termht; ji = + M hC; s ; i i j = P received M i there is a node ht; ji in C s.t. i princt = P , ii ht; ji h s; ii, and iii termht; ji = ,M
To give the truth conditions for other formulae, we must rst spell out some of the structure of the term algebra and de ne a notion of submessage. The following de nitions are taken from 22 and can also be found in the preceding strand space papers.
Assume the following:
A set T A of texts representing the atomic messages. A set K A of cryptographic keys disjoint from T, equipped with a unary operator inv : K ! K.
inv is injective; i.e., that it maps each memb e r o f a k ey pair for an asymmetric cryptosystem to the other; and that it maps a symmetric key to itself. If k is a set of keys, k ,1 denotes the set of inverses of elements of k.
The next assumption we make is that A is the algebra freely generated from T and K by the two operators encr and join. As noted in 22 , this assumption has been commonly made in this area of research going back to 5 . As in 22 it is probably stronger than what we ultimately need but is pedagogically convenient. Amongst other things, it implies that encryptions and concatenations are unique and always distinct from each other and from T and K.
Central to the semantics of said formulae is the concept of an ideal. Interestingly, in the strand space papers, it was introduced to formulate general facts about the penetrator's capabilities; while in this paper, we will say virtually nothing about the nature of the penetrator. We now give truth conditions for said formulae hC; s ; i i j = P said M i there is a message M 0 s.t. hC; s ; i i j = P sent M 0 and M @ k M 0 where k is the set of keys possessed by P at hs; ii.
Notice that P is held accountable, e.g., for saying M at n, if he sends fMg K at n 0 n and he has K at n, even if K was not in his key set until some n 00 s.t. n 0 n 00 n.
A de nition that does not occur in any of the strand space papers is that of a lter. In many contexts, lters are the duals of ideals. In our case, they are useful for giving semantics to got formulae, those that express the understood messages contained in received messages. 11
De nition 4. The smallest k-lter containing h is denoted F k h .
In general, the relation between lters and ideals is not so simple because, in public-key cryptography, one may h a ve K and not have K ,1 , or vice versa. However, in this paper we are limiting ourselves to the symmetric key case, K = K ,1 . In this case there is a simple relation. This relation also holds when both cognates of a public private key pair are known. It is easy to show that We can use the truth conditions for said and got formulae to further give the truth conditions for key goodness. hC; s ; i i j = P K $ Q i , for all hs 0 ; i 0 i 2 N C , hC; s 0 ; i 0 i j = R said fM from Qg K implies either hC; s 0 ; i 0 i j = R received fM from Qg K , or R = Q and hC; s 0 ; i 0 i j = R said M. If hC; s 0 ; i 0 i j = R said fMg K instead of the stronger hC; s 0 ; i 0 i j = R said fM from Qg K , then R 2 f P;Qg instead of the stronger R = P .
Note that these are the truth conditions from 17 with hC; s ; i i replacing hr; t i and hC; s 0 ; i 0 i replacing hr; t 0 i throughout. This was itself based on the truth conditions for goodness given in 1 .
Once we h a ve a mechanism to express the beginning of the currentepoch, we will beable to similarly dispatch the freshness and jurisdiction formulae. In order to do that, we m ust again confront the absence of a global concept of time. In the system models for possible world semantics of BAN-like logics, it was trivial to stipulate a global time t 0 and then de ne something as fresh if it was not said by a n yone prior to t 0 . We instead de ne a concept now as follows.
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